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This study uses panel data at suburb level to estimates the elasticity water demands in 
Perth, Australia from 1995 to 2005. After deriving the consumer’s water demand under a 
non-linear budget constraint, we estimate the water demand model, which accounts for 
how water (and other purchased goods) is used to satisfy fundamental desires of the 
household.  We  have  applied  the  specification  of  price  that  provided  the  correctly 
estimated  marginal  price  from  the  block  tariff  structure,  and  employed  a  maximum 
likelihood estimation technique to tackle the endogeneity and heteroskedasticity issues. 
Our estimation of water demand price elasticities are slightly higher (more elastic) than 
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I. Introduction 
 
The recent survey on water use by Australian Bureau of Statistics indicates that Western 
Australia is currently facing significant challenges in meeting its growing water needs. 
Following  a  34  percent  rise  in  the  number  of  households  from  449,000  in  1992  to 
603,300 in 2006, the water demand for in the Perth metropolitan area has been increasing 
substantially (ABS, 2007). The survey also indicates that about 80 percent of households 
live in a detached dwelling, where outdoor-water use accounts for about half of annual 
water consumption (ibid.). Some households are able to access groundwater or use rain-
water tanks (around 26 percent of households have bores and about 5 percent installed the 
rain-water tank in their backyard (ibid.)). As such, they are able to switch away from 
using scheme water for outdoor use. Nevertheless, per capita water consumption in Perth 
is higher than any other Australian capital cities (ABS, 2006).  
Over the past years, the government of Western Australia has adopted a number of water 
conservation  policies.
1  The  aim  is  to  reduce  per  capita  water  consumption  from  the 
unrestricted level of 180 kilolitres a person per year to 155 kilolitres a person per year by 
2012 (Government of WA, 2003). Usage restrictions in the form of a two-days-per-week-
sprinkler  restriction  on  lawn  watering  have  been  imposed  since  October  2001;  the 
“Waterwise Rebate Programme” that encourages Western Australians to become more 
water efficient has been in operation since February 2003.
2 In tandem with these water 
                                                 
1 In Western Australia (WA), the price of water is regulated by the government and water services are 
provided  by  state  owned  corporation:  Water  Coporation,  Aqwest  and  Busselton  Water  The  governing 
legislation of the state owned corporation indirectly allows the government to influence the operational 
efficiency of each corporation through the price and budget setting process. For further details of how the 
government regulate the price of water in WA see Economic Regulation Authority (2004). 
2  The  rebates  that  are  available  for  the  approved  water-saving-devices  include:  washing  machines, 
showerheads,  garden  bores,  rainwater  tanks,  tap  timers,  soil  wetting  agents,  in-flow  tap  regulators, 
qreywater re-use systems, aerobic treatment units, swimming pool covers, subsurface irrigation pipework, 
rain sensors and waterwise garden assessments.   2 
conservation policies, water tariffs with increasing prices over quantity blocks were used 
to  encourage  water  saving  and  promoting  the  equity  and  the  efficiency  in  the  water 
sector.
3 However, in practice, heterogeneity in demand and the state owned corporation’s 
requirement for cost recovery lead to efficiency and equity trade offs in the design of 
increasing block tariff schedules (Brennan, 2007). Instead of using water tariff setting 
process,  the  government  has  recently  used  the  Community  Service  Obligation  (CSO) 
payment to achieve the efficiency  gains (Economic Regulation Authority, 2004).
4 By 
adopting  this  policy  measure,  the  government  relies  heavily  on  water  restriction  and 
conservation  programs  for  demand  management,  while  allowing  the  water  tariffs  to 
increase by the inflation rate.  
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Source: estimated using data from Table A.1, in Appendix. rp1 to rp5 are the 1995 real price of water tariff 
in the first to the fifth block, respectively. 
                                                 
3 These tariffs attempt to satisfy both efficiency and equity goals by providing pricing signals to influence 
consumption decisions at the margin, while making non-discretionary consumption available at a lower 
cost.  
4 The reason for not using water tariff to promote the efficiency in water sector may relate to governments’ 
reluctance to rely heavily on price signals to ration water demand or supply due to political concern over 
the social implications of charging for water (see for example OECD, 1999).    3 
 
As shown in Figure 1, customers of the Water Corporation in Perth face a five-block 
tariff structure. Over the period 1995-2005, only the real price at the upper rates has 
increased, while the lower rates have remained relatively constant.
5 Although setting the 
water tariffs in this way can be seen as a more equitable approach, it has been criticized 
for not reflecting the true marginal cost of water. Moreover, customers have to pay a 
fixed charge that takes up about 50 percent of the water bill.
6 As only half of the water 
bill  is  tied  to  water  consumption,  this  price  setting  may  offer  little  incentive  for 
consumers to invest in water saving devices or to conserve water. In this regard, the 
prices  of  water  in  Perth  have  been  seen  as  an  ineffective  tool  for  water  demand 
management  (Economic  Regulation  Authority,  2004).  In  the  2007  final  report  of  the 
water price enquiry the Economic Regulation Authority has recommended that the prices 
of water in Perth should be increased, to reflect its marginal cost (Economic Regulation 
Authority, 2007).  
While  there  has  long  been  recognition  of  the  roles  of  water  prices  in  promoting  the 
efficiency in the water sector, there are  few studies of the effectiveness of water pricing 
in Perth (see for example; Thomas and Syme, 1988; Henderson, 1998; and Habibi, 2003). 
We address this imbalance by estimating water demand elasticities, using Perth’s suburb 
data  from  1995  to  2005.  We  estimate  own-price  demand  elasticities  for  indoor  and 
outdoor water use. We found that our estimation of the price elasticity of demand is 
slightly higher than that estimated by Thomas and Syme (1988), but our result is broadly 
in line with other estimates in the literature. We structure the paper as follows. Section II 
                                                 
5 In this period, the average nominal price of water tariffs was increased by about 2.2 percent per year.  
6 The proportion of fixed charge to total bill is estimated for consumers who consume between 151kL to 
351kL per year, using the prices of water from Table A1.   4 
discusses  the  process  to  derive  a  residential  water  demand  model  and  its  estimation 
issues.  Section  III  explains  methods  of  data  construction  and  their  sources.  The 
estimation results are present and discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes.    
II. Methodology  
 
The  extensive  body  of  literature  on  urban  residential  water-demand,  summarised  by 
Arbués et al. (2003) and Worthington and Hoffmann (2006), suggests that water demand 
has been determined by various factors, including, inter alia: water pricing structure, 
household  income,  socio-demographic  factors  (i.e.  household  size,  age  of  household 
members, cultures), house characteristics (i.e. age of the house, number of bedrooms, lot 
size,  the  stock  of  water-using  appliances  and  technology  efficiency),  and  water 
conservation programs such as outdoor watering restrictions, public education campaigns 
and rebate schemes. Based on this premise, we derive a residential water demand using 
the basic framework of household production theory, which was originally introduced by 
Becker  (1965)  and  Lancaster  (1966).  According  to  the  household  production  theory, 
households purchase goods on the market to serve as inputs into a household production 
process, to provide the implicit goods and services which appear as arguments in the 
household’s utility function.  
Like many household services, water demands arise principally from requirements for 
different indoor and outdoor activities such as providing showers, car washing, watering 
lawns and gardens, and swimming pool. As such, we assumed that households decides to 
consume  at a certain water-consumption level (i.e. consumption blocks from d1 to d5) to 
produce indoor and outdoor water services (g), and use the rest of their budget (y) to 
spend on other goods and services (o). We also assume:    5 
(i)  the  production  of  g  can  be  affected  by  climate  conditions  and  water 
conservation policies (z),  
(ii)  households  select  water-using  appliances  to  produce  g  and  have  the 
opportunity in the long run to adapt to price increases by purchasing more 
efficient  water-using  appliances,  installing  efficient  plumbing  fixtures  and 
planting  drought-tolerant  gardens  Household  behaviour  is  captured  by  the 
technical coefficient, θ, in the production function,  
(iii)  demographic  factors  (df)  and  housing  characters  (hc)  also  determine 
household’s preference, and  
(iv)  the price of o is used as a numeraire. 
 Therefore, the representative household’s utility function (u) can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ) { } 1 5 ,..., ; , ; , u u g d d d z o df hc q   =     (1) 
In this framework the household’s decision can be thought of as a two-stage optimisation 
problem (see for example Muellbauer, 1974 and Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). In the 
first stage, the consumer behaves as a firm, and the objective is to minimise the cost of 
producing  g,  whereas  in  the  second  stage  of  the  optimisation  problem,  the  consumer 
maximises the household’s utility. The result of the optimisations yields a conditional 
water demand function (d) of the representative household as follows:
7 
                                                 
7 Alternatively, water demand function can be derived using discrete-continuous choice model. That is in 
first stage, a representative household select consumption blocks (discrete choice) by maximising utility 
subject  to  non-linear  budget  constraint.  In  the  second  stage,  the  representative  household  select 
consumption  level  in  the  selected  block  (continuous  choice)  by  maximising  indirect  utility.  See  for 
example: Moffitt (1986, 1990), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), and Corral et al. (1998). Also, see Appendix 
2 for deriving the water demand function.   6 
( ) ( )
* *
1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 , ; , , , , ; , , , ... d bd mp y s z df hc b d mp y s z df hc c D c D q q = - + + - + + + ⋯     (2) 
 
where k =1,…,5 denotes the water consumption levels, 
( )
*
1 1 1 1 1 if  .  and  0 otherwise b d D b = < = , 
( ) ( )
*
1 1 if   < .  and  0 otherwise 2,...,4 k k k k k b D d D b k - = < = = , 
( )
*
5 5 5 5 1 if  . , and  0 otherwise b d D b = > = , 
( ) ( )
* 1 if  .  and  0 otherwise 1,...,5 k k k k c d D c k = = = =  
 
Following Corral et al. (1998) and Martínez-Espiñeira (2003), we obtain an aggregate 
water demand at different suburbs (i) and periods (t) as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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where  it d = average water demand per household in period (t),  
            nit = total number of households per suburbs (i) in period (t),  
          nk,it = number of households in suburbs (i) who consume in block k,  
          other variables defined as above. 
 
We then derive the empirical model by replacing the generic form of the aggregate water 
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            where  it e = unobservable variant factors affecting water demand across suburbs. 
 
However, one could not directly estimate the demand model at this stage, as Equation (4) 
could  yield  biased  estimates.  This  is  because  endogeneity  issues  may  arise  from  the 
demand  behaviour  of  a  utility-maximising  household.  As  mentioned  earlier,  when 
maximising t utility households have to select the water consumption level ( it d ) that 
should be used to provide services for different indoor and outdoor activities.  However,   7 
price varies with consumption level.  As such, marginal price (mpk), virtual income (y-sk) 
and number of households consume in each block (nk) are endogenously determined, and 
thus correlated with the error term.  
To tackle the endogeneity issues, we have to estimate the proportion of households per 
blocks ( , k it p ), as shown in Equation (5) below, using the Tobit regression model.  
( )
,
, , , ,  k=1,...,5
k it
k it it it it
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n
p f y z df hc
n









= ∑  
 
We  then  have  to  use  the  estimated  proportion  of  water  consumption  per  blocks  to 
compute  the  weighted-mean  marginal  price  ( ˆit mp ),  weighted-mean  income  difference 
















=∑         (7) 
ˆ it it it i y s = -         (8) 
 
To  obtain  the  prices  elasticity  for  indoor  and  outdoor  water  demands,  we  need  the 
average water consumption per household for indoor and outdoor activities, or during 
winter and summer, to be used as the regressant ( it d ) in (4). Alternatively, we still can 
obtain  the  prices  elasticity  for  indoor  and  outdoor  water  demands  by  including  the 
interactive-price-policy-effect variables (mpb01 and mpa01) in the model, to capture the 
potential impacts between water prices and the post-2001 water conservation policies on 
water demand. By substituting Equations (6) to (8) into Equation (4), then including the   8 
policy and the price-policy interaction variables, we obtained the empirical regression 
model as follows: 
L
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  Where   ˆ 01 * mpb mp = (1-d0105) captures the pre-2001-interactive-price-policy effects, 
        ˆ 01 * mpa mp = d0105 captures the post-2001-interactive-price-policy effects,  
d0105 singles out the potential impacts of conservative policies, d0105 =1 if 
year=2001 to 2005, =0 otherwise. 
 
From Equation (9) we can compute the prices elasticity for indoor and outdoor water 
demand  from  the  estimate  coefficients  of  the  price-policy  interaction  effect  variables 
(mpb01 and mpa01). This is because the two-days-per-week-sprinkler restrictions that 
were imposed after 2001 has limited water use for the most of outdoor activities and may 
have restricted water  consumption to the point where there is little opportunity for  a 
response to price changes (i.e. the restriction has shifted consumers to a corner solution 
wrt price changes and external use, and only extreme price changes would cause further 
change). The coefficient of mpa01 variable should capture how households adjust using 
the indoor-water-using appliances in response to change in water prices. Therefore, we 
can use the estimate of 3 b to compute the value of price  elasticity demand for indoor 
activities. Likewise, the mpb01 variable should capture how households respond for both 
indoor and outdoor water use, and thus the estimate of  2 b  were used to compute total 
price  elasticity.  The  pre-restriction  outdoor  price-elasticity  demand  can  be  computed 
using the total price elasticity and the indoor price-elasticity demands (see Appendix 3 
for deriving the outdoor price-elasticity formula).    9 
Theoretically, the water demand in Equation (9) can be  estimated using pooled OLS 
techniques, but many studies suggest that the process of constructing the instrumental 
variables, similar to that we employed in Equations (6) to (8), may not solve completely 
the endogeneity errors (see a discussion for this issue in Arbués et al., 2003, pp. 92-95). 
Billings  (1982)  suggest  estimating  the  water  demand  model  using  the  maximum 
likelihood technique. In addition, although the use of various explanatory variables to 
control for the heterogeneous water consumption patterns across suburbs in Equation (9), 
we need to account for unobserved factors affecting the average of water consumption 
per household. We deal with this issue by adding the random effect component into the 
error term of Equation (9) as follows: 
it i it u e e = +                                                                                                                       (10) 
            where  it u = a random variable representing unobservable factors accounting for 
                              the deviation of water consumption per household across suburbs, 
                        it e = a classical error term with zero mean and a homoscedastic covariance 
                              matrix. 
The final form of the water demand model depends on the availability of data, which we 
discuss in detail in the following section. 
III. Data and variables  
 
Annual data on water consumption at the suburb level is provided by Water Corporation. 






), and water demand ( it d ). The data covers the period 1994/95-2004/05 
with the consumption year starting from July and ending at June. The weighted-mean 
marginal  price  ( it mp ),  and  the  weighted-mean  income  difference  ( it s )  were  also   10 
constructed  using  the  prices  of  water  provided  by  the  Water  Corporation.  The  Perth 
consumer price index downloaded from the Australian Bureau of Statistic’s website was 
used to compute the real water prices.  
Monthly climatic data ( it z ) stemming from five weather stations (Jandakot, Gosnells, 
Perth, Medina, and Swanborne) are obtained from the Bureau of Meteorology. We then 
converted  the  data  into  season  variables:  summer  precipitation  (precipitations)  and 
summer cooling-degree-day (cddays), by making the season periods compatible with the 
water consumption-year periods. That is we considered the summer period starts from 
November and ends in April of a consecutive year, while the winter period from July-
October and end in May-June of a consecutive year. To construct the climatic data at 
suburb level, we used the urban map number published in the 2007 Perth and Surrounds 
Street Directory to determine the locations between the suburbs and the weather stations. 
We then assigned the climatic data to each suburb according to its closest location to the 
weather stations.  
Demographic  factors  ( it df )  at  suburb  level  are  sourced  from  the  census  data  of  the 
Australian  Bureau  of  Statistic.  We  extracted  the  following  groups  of  data:  age  and 
population distribution, house ownership, housing characters and household earning. We 
used the data to construct household income (y), the number of households owning their 
house (ownhouse), the number of households renting the house (renthouse), the number 
of people who is over 65 years old (ageover65), the number of people who is under 19 
years old (ageunder19), and household sizes (hhsize). Since the census data are only 
available for 1996, 2001 and 2006, we used linear-interpolation technique to estimate the 
missing observations in other years.    11 
The  housing  characteristics  ( it hc )  at  suburb  level  are  provided  by  CSIRO.  The  data 
contains number of bores per 100 accounts (bores) and the average lot size (lotsize). 
However, the number of bores per 100 accounts is available for only 2001. We did not 
attempt  to  estimate  the  missing  data,  as  the  information  about  the  history  of  bore 
installation is limited. To be able to estimate the models in panel data, we set the numbers 
of bores for other years equals to the number of bore installed in 2001. This means that 
the impacts of bores on water consumption could be under-estimated. Summary statistics 
of variables used in the estimation of water demand models are provided in the Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Variable units Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
d kL / Househouse 2419 363.3 124.3 102.7 1684.8
mp 1995 Dollars / kL 2390 0.72 0.05 0.59 0.89
s 1995 Dollars  2390 -120.0 21.4 -242.0 -63.1
i 1995 Dollars  2390 40506.2 12045.5 16062.4 96257.2
y 1995 Dollars  2419 40229.7 12081.3 15914.2 96173.8
ownhouse % of total detached house 2419 75.5 9.3 33.6 95.1
renthouse % of total detached house 2419 17.3 7.8 2.4 56.9
ageover65 % of total population 2419 11.9 6.1 0.0 44.3
ageunder19 % of total population 2419 29.3 6.2 12.4 49.2
hhsize Persons 2419 2.7 0.4 1.5 3.6
lotsize square metres 2419 737.7 105.7 411.0 1187.5
bores bores/100 accounts 2419 23.4 20.5 0.2 83.5
precipitations milimetres 2419 110.5 53.4 33.1 251.6
cddays Celsius-days 2419 120.4 43.5 25.5 214.4
Notes: d: water consumption per household, mp: weighted-mean marginal price, s: weighted-
mean  income  difference  per  household,  i:  household’s  weighted-mean  virtual  income,  y: 
household’s real income, ownhouse: number of households owning the house, renthouse: number 
of households renting the house, ageover65: number of people who is over 65 yrs, ageunder19: 
number of people who is under 19 yrs, hhsize: household sizes, lotsize: lot size, bores: number of 
bores per 100 accounts, precipitations: summer precipitation, cddays: summer cooling degree 
days.  
 
IV. Results and discussions 
 
For the estimation of Equations (5) and (9), we considered the observations with the 
water consumption per household less than 100 kL per annum and the lot size bigger than   12 
1200 square meter, as the outliers, and were dropped. Therefore, we have an unbalanced 
panel  data  of  234  Perth’s  suburbs  observed  over  11  years  (1995-2005)  with  2390 
observations. We estimated the proportions of household per blocks (Equation (5)) using 
climate data, demographic factors and housing characters as the explanatory variables. As 
suggested  by  Schefter  and  David  (1985),  we  used  the  observed  proportion  of  water 











).  We  then  compared  the  predicted  proportions  of  water-consumption  per  block 
with their original observations, as shown in Figure 2. The bar graphs suggest that the 
predictions are reasonably close to the originally observed values.   
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Figure 3 below shows the variation of the weighted-mean  real marginal price ( ˆit mp ) 
across suburbs. Notice that the trend of weighted marginal price (solid line) increased   13 
from about $0.65 in 1995 to about $0.75 in 2005, despite some water tariffs have been set 
to change in line with the inflation rate (see the discussion earlier). The reason is that 
more households consumed in the upper blocks (pr2 to pr5 in Figure 2) where the price 
tariffs were increased in real terms. Therefore, we expected that households should have 
reduced water consumption in response to the increase in prices of water over the year 
under-investigation.    













We  estimated  the  water  demand  in  Equation  (9)  as  random  effect  model  using  the 
maximum  likelihood  estimation  technique.  Apart  from  marginal  price  income  and 
dummy for to capture the effect of water conservation policies, we also included climate 
data,  demographic  factors  and  housing  characters  employed  in  Equation  (5)  as 
explanatory variables. Since the correlations among the demographic variables are high, 
we  estimated  the  water  demand  model  in  various  specifications,  and  reported  the 
estimation results in Table 2 below.    14 
Table 2. Estimated water demand models 
Dependent variable (d) Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6
d0105 -304.305*** -301.658*** -335.753*** -336.376*** -314.167*** -313.404***
  (55.586) (56.162) (56.906) (56.893) (56.154) (55.848)
ampp -533.109*** -578.260*** -559.081*** -558.108*** -557.155*** -551.504***
  (49.494) (48.872) (49.860) (49.527) (48.813) (48.601)
amp0105 -178.685** -218.340*** -162.654** -161.117** -187.181*** -183.504**
  (72.702) (73.026) (74.241) (73.822) (72.836) (72.424)
y 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ownhouse -2.966*** 0.076
  (0.924) (0.448)
renthouse -1.129 0.006
  (0.989) (0.517)
ageover65 -1.244 -4.514***
  (1.013) (0.813)
ageunder19 3.037*** 5.314***
  (0.962) (0.729)
hhsize 66.861*** 81.590***
  (16.285) (10.778)
lotsize 0.081*** 0.069** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.090*** 0.074***
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
bores -1.820*** -2.164*** -2.495*** -2.498*** -1.955*** -1.943***
  (0.268) (0.238) (0.232) (0.233) (0.265) (0.255)
precipitations -0.125*** -0.137*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.128*** -0.126***
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
cddays 0.077* 0.118*** 0.065 0.064 0.084* 0.080*
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
year 18.454*** 15.750*** 15.978*** 16.018*** 16.938*** 17.180***
  (1.303) (1.136) (1.175) (1.153) (1.147) (1.141)
_cons -36358*** -31111*** -31391*** -31467*** -33255*** -33942***
  (2546.540) (2241.138) (2316.107) (2274.535) (2264.222) (2255.785)
Number of observations 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397
Number of suburbs 234 234 234 234 234 234
Sigma_u  70.868 67.546 66.605 66.595 71.343 70.477
  (3.972) (3.491) (3.378) (3.377) (3.902) (3.812)
Sigma_e  55.921 56.596 57.443 57.444 56.602 56.347
  (0.864) (0.865) (0.876) (0.876) (0.872) (0.867)
Likelihood-ratio test for Ho: Sigma_u=0 1314*** 1336*** 1325*** 1328*** 1366*** 1364***
Income elasticity 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.60 0.53 0.54
total price elasticity -1.06 -1.15 -1.11 -1.11 -1.10 -1.09
indoor price elasticity -0.77 -0.94 -0.70 -0.70 -0.81 -0.79
outdoor price elasticity -1.30 -1.32 -1.45 -1.45 -1.36 -1.35
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, figures in the brackets are standard error. Price 
and income elasticities were estimated at the sample mean. Outdoor price elasticity was computed using the formula in 
Appendix 3, and the proportion of outdoor demand, α=54.1 percent (taken from McFarlane et al., 2006).  
In the maximum likelihood estimation, the distribution of water consumption across suburbs is assumed to be normal. 
We performed a bootstrap estimation, as there is no pre-assumption about the distribution shape for this estimation 
technique. The standard error for all coefficients estimated using the bootstrap estimation are similar to that reported in 
Table 2. The bootstrap standard error is not report here but available on request. 
  
   15 
Overall, the selected econometric technique seem to be appropriate for all models, as the 
likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis stating that the average water consumption per 
household  are  homogenous  across  suburbs  is  rejected.  All  estimated  coefficients  are 
statistically  significant  and  have  the  expected  signs;  excepted  the  coefficients  on  the 
number of households owning the houses are not significant in model (2) and the sign 
should be positive in model (1); the coefficients on the number of households renting the 
houses are not significant but have only the right sign in model (1); the coefficients on 
number of people who is over 65 years old have the expected sign but is not significant in 
model (1).  
The estimated coefficients for d0105, mpb01, and mpa01 have a negative sign suggests 
that the water conservation policies and water prices adopted by the water authority of 
Western Australia have contributed to the decrease in water consumption by households 
in detached houses in Perth metropolitan. The  magnitude of mpa01 coefficient being 
smaller in absolute term than that of mpb01 suggest that the impact of water prices on 
consumption  is  more  inelastic  after  the  post-2001  periods.  Other  variables  such  as 
renthouse, ageover65, bores, and precipitations   have a negative estimated coefficient, 
while  ownhouse,  ageunder19,  hhsize,  lotsize  and  ccdays  have  a  positive  estimated 
coefficient. This result is consistent with the findings in the water demand literature; for 
example, Arbués et al. (2003) and Nauges and Thomas (2000) argued that demand for 
water in areas with a higher proportion of younger persons is likely to be higher, as more 
frequent laundering and use of water-intensive outdoor leisure activities. Other examples 
can be found in Arbués et al. (2003) and Worthington and Hoffmann (2006).    16 
We computed the elasticity demands at the sample mean and found the income elasticity 
to be in a range between 0.50 and 0.60, while the pre-2001 price elasticity (total price 
elasticity) ranges between -1.05 to -1.14 and the post-2001 price elasticity (indoor price 
elasticity) between -0.70 to -0.94. To compute outdoor price elasticity, we assumed that 
water demand for outdoor activity accounts for 54.1 percent of total consumption (this 
figure taken from McFarlane et al., 2006). The estimated outdoor-price elasticity is in a 
range between -1.30 to -1.45. 
Table 3 compares our estimation of price elasticity demand with other studies. Notice that 
the price elasticity demands during winter is similar to that of indoor demand, while the 
price elasticity demand during summer is similar to that of outdoor demand.  
Table 3. Comparison price elasticity demands 
 
Authors Year Location
Winter -0.06 to -0.3
NRA (1993) various  USA & Canada Summer -0.43 to -1.5
cited in Houston et al (2001) All year -0.25 to -0.9
Indoor -0.13 to -0.14
Veck and Bill 2000 South Africa Outdoor -0.19 to -0.47
Total -0.14 to -0.18
Indoor -0.24 to -0.67
Ran Water study (2000) 2000 South Africa Outdoor -0.39 to -0.79
cited in van Zyl et al (2003) Total -0.29 to -0.69
Indoor -0.04
Thomas and Syme 1988 Perth, Australia Outdoor -0.31
Total -0.18
NRA (1993) various  Australia Winter -0.04 to -0.36
cited in Houston et al (2001) Summer -0.30 to -1.20
Winter -0.29 to-0.45
Dandy et al.  2001 Adelaide, Australia Summer -0.69 to -0.86
All year -0.63 to -0.77
this study Perth, Australia Indoor -0.70 to -0.94
Outdoor -1.30 to -1.45




.   17 
Comparing our results with other studies in Australia suggests that our estimation for 
indoor price elasticity demands are slightly higher (more elastic), while outdoor and total 
price elasticities are broadly in line with those studies (except for Thomas and Syme,1988 
where our estimation for all price elasticities are higher). It is not surprising that our 
estimation for indoor price elasticity is high. This is because the demand for water during 
the two-days-per-week-sprinkler restriction may include water use for outdoor activities 




This study has provided new insights into the importance of water price in promoting 
water  conservation  in  Perth.  Over  the  past  years,  water  price  have  been  seen  as  an 
ineffective tool for water demand management, as the empirical evidence suggested that 
the  price  elasticity  of  demand  for  residential  water  in  Perth  was  relatively  inelastic. 
However,  we  argue  that  the  water  use  in  Perth  has  been  dominated  by  discretionary 
outdoor  demands,  and  that  we  expected  the  greater  responsiveness  in  water  use  to 
changes in the prices of water. To support this hypothesis, we have estimated the water 
demand model by applying the price specification that provided the correctly estimated 
marginal price from the block tariff structure, and employed the maximum likelihood 
estimation technique to deal with the heterogeneity and endogeneity issues.  
Our key findings can be summarised as follows. The empirical results suggest that the 
price elasticity of demand for residential water in Perth is relatively more elastic than 
previous  estimates.  The  non-price  control  such  as  the  sprinkler  restriction  and  the 
“Waterwise Rebate Programme” and bores have been worked well in promoting water 
conservation. Other factors beyond the control of water authority that have influenced   18 
water use are housing characters, demographic factors, and climate conditions. Some of 
these  factors  have  significantly  influenced  the  increase  in  water  demand:  income, 
household  size,  lot  size  of  the  house,  and  the  warm  temperature  which  measured  by 
cooling degree days (the extent of the temperature in the house that needs to be cool 
down).  
While this finding suggests that the price-based policy instrument may be important as a 
demand driver, more empirical work is needed to estimate the price elasticity for indoor 
and outdoor demands. For example, the price elasticity demands could be estimated using 
the observed water consumption for indoor and outdoor activities if that is available or 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
Table A1: Residential water tariff and consumer price index for Perth 
  
Year  Fix_Charge 
Per Dollars 
 P0_150 




Cents / kL 
 P550_750 
Cents / kL 
 P750_950 
Cents / kL 
 P950_1150 
Cents / kL 
 P1150_1950 
Cents / kL 
 P1950plus 
Cents / kL 
cpi95
1995 121.45 27.5 55 64.4 70.3 74.7 83.3 83.3 102.8 100
1996 121.45 34 55 64.4 70.3 74.7 83.3 83.3 102.8 102.58
1997 126.3 35.4 57.2 70.8 77.3 82.2 91.6 91.6 113.1 102.51
1998 130.1 36.5 58.2 77.2 84.3 89.6 99.8 99.8 123.3 103.67
1999 132.7 37.2 60.1 81.1 92.7 98.6 109.8 109.8 135.6 105.52
2000 135.4 37.94 61.3 82.72 94.55 100.57 112 112 138.31 109.72
2001 140.1 39.2 63.4 85.6 97.9 104.1 104.1 115.9 143.1 114.2
2002 144.2 40.3 65.2 88.1 100.7 107.1 107.1 119.3 147.2 117.55
2003 149 41.6 67.4 91 120 120 150 150 150 120.18
2004 149 41.6 67.4 91 120 120 150 150 150 123.07
2005 152.3 42.5 68.9 93 122.6 122.6 153.3 153.3 153.3 127.77
2006 154.6 49.3 73.2 95 126.8 126.8 158.8 158.8 158.8 133.07
2007 162.6 56.9 78.4 98 132.4 132.4 166.1 166.1 166.1
Sources: Water tariff are sourced from Water Corp. The figures attached to a letter P is the lower to upper bound 





Table A2. Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
amp s i y ownhouse renthouse ageover65 ageunder19 hhsize lotsize bores precipitations cddays
amp 1.00
s -0.92 1.00
i -0.03 0.16 1.00
y -0.04 0.16 1.00 1.00
ownhouse 0.22 -0.16 0.57 0.57 1.00
renthouse -0.05 0.02 -0.49 -0.49 -0.93 1.00
ageover65 -0.23 0.23 -0.29 -0.29 -0.45 0.38 1.00
ageunder19 0.25 -0.27 0.26 0.26 0.46 -0.42 -0.67 1.00
hhsize 0.31 -0.29 0.48 0.48 0.72 -0.64 -0.73 0.83 1.00
lotsize -0.09 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.16 -0.20 0.16 0.01 0.04 1.00
bores -0.38 0.37 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 0.10 0.42 -0.34 -0.26 0.23 1.00
precipitations 0.16 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00
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let k =1,…,5 denotes the water consumption levels,  
sk = Taylor-Nordin difference variable (income difference),  
Dk = the upper limit of each consumption block,  
[ ] . C = cost function, 
[ ] . g = production function,  
[ ] . d =conditional water demand function, 
[ ] . mp = water tariff (marginal price), 
z = climate conditions and water conservation policies, 
θ = the technical coefficient, 
df = demographic factors and 
hc= housing characters 
Optimisation process: 
In the first stage, the consumer behaves as a firm, and the objective is to minimise the 
cost of producing water services. This amount is equal to solving the problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 5 1 5 .
1 5
Minimise  ,..., ; ,...,    
                            subject to  ,..., ;
d C d d d mp mp mp o
g g d d d z q
+    
=    
   (2.1) 
Solving this optimisation problem gives the following expenditure function: 
( ) 1 5 ,..., , ; , E E mp mp mp g z q   =    (2.2) 
Applying Shephard’s lemma gives the conditional water demand function as follows: 
( )
( ) 1 5
1 5
,..., , ; ,
,..., , ; ,
E mp mp mp g z




  ¶     =   ¶
  (2.3) 
In the second stage of the optimisation problem, the consumer maximises the utility. This 
amount is equal to solving the problem: 
( )
( ) ( )
,
1 5 1 5
Maximise  , ; ,    
                          subject to  ,..., ,..., , ; ,
g o u g o df hc
y s s s E mp mp mp g z o q - = +    
   (2.4) 
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The result of this optimisation procedure gives the demand function for outdoor water 
services (G) as follows: 
( ) ( ) 1 5 1 5 ,..., , ,..., ; , , , g g mp mp mp y s s s z df hc q   = -     (2.5) 
Finally, the outdoor water demand function can then be found by substituting Equation 
(2.5) into Equations (2.3) yields: 
         
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 5 1 5 1 5
1 5 1 5
,..., , ,..., , ,..., ; , , , ; ,
or 
,..., , ,..., ; , , ,
d d mp mp mp g mp mp mp y s s s z df hc z
d d mp mp mp y s s s z df hc
q q
q
  = -  
  = -  
 (2.6) 
Since consumers select the optimal consumption level at certain block, the water demand 
function can be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )
* *
1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5
1 1 5 5
, ; , , , , ; , , ,
                                         ...
  
d bd mp y s z df hc b d mp y s z df hc
c D c D
q q = - + + -
+ + +
⋯




1 1 1 1 1 if  .  and  0 otherwise b d D b = < = , 
( ) ( )
*
1 1 if   < .  and  0 otherwise 2,...,4 k k k k k b D d D b k - = < = = , 
( )
*
5 5 5 5 1 if  . , and  0 otherwise b d D b = > = , 
( ) ( )
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Appendix 3: Deriving the Outdoor Price-Elasticity Formula. 
 
Let: 
 be the own price elasticity for total water demand
 be the own price elasticity for indoor water demand




























   
We know that: 
 






















  (3.3) 
Take partial derivative of (3.1) with respect to p and multiply
p
q
 on both side of the 
equation yields: 
 
i o i o q q q q p q p p p
q p p p q q p q p
  ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= + = +   ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶  










q q q a
a
= - Û =
-




q q q a
a
= Û =   (3.6) 





q q p q p p





  (3.7) 
( ) 1 t i o e a e ae = - +   (3.8) 
 
Therefore, the outdoor elasticity demand can be expressed as follows: 
( )
1
1 o t i e e a e
a
  = - -    (3.9) 
 